|Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences.|
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|Frank I 17
Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true - Definition property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property - Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies - it makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes - but there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed A to proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time - e.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds - therefore no knowledge).
Frank I 329
Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional) - Advantage: non-perspectivic access - ((s) not everyone has their own possible worlds.
Frank I 355
Propositions: Have nothing intersubjective per se - problematic therefore subjectivity of reference of the first person.
Lewis IV 137
Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times.
E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both.
E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference proposition/statement).
Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions.
Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties.
Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - > inclusion, overlapping, etc.
ad Stechow 42
Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds).
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994