|Propositions, philosophy: propositions are defined as the meanings of sentences, whereby a sentence is interpreted as a character string, which must still be interpreted in relation to a situation or a speaker. E.g. “I am hungry” has a different meaning from the mouth of each new speaker. On the other hand, the sentence “I am hungry” from the mouth of the speaker, who first expressed the German sentence, has the same meaning as the German sentence uttered by him. See also meaning, propositional attitudes, identity conditions, opacity, utterances, sentences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 323
Propositions/Tradition: (not represented by anyone in pure form, not even by Frege): ideal convergence of the elements of thought, speech, reality and communication - propositions that are primarily defined as carriers of timeless truth values, fundamental support of linguistic meaning as constituents of reality and as publicly accessible contents of communication - Advantage: that leaves no gap between the content of thought, and that to which it is directed - for reality arise - CastanedaVs: this does not apply to indexical sentences - individuation: of indexical sentences: in the speech act, not by meaning.
Proposition/Tradition: (Frege, Moore): 1) psychological units, 2) ontological, 3) ontologically objective (intersubjective), 4) metaphysical units 5) logical units, 6) semantic u. 7) linguistic units of communication - CastanedaVs : discrepancies of between 1 - 7 in the case of diachronic flow of experiences in the changing world - VsTradition: fails with indexical reference with "I", "here", "now" - Problem: E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen in my liver": understanding without knowledge of the truth value - therefore meaning unequal truth value (VsFrege) - what is meant by the formation of a sentence is not some objective feature or thing in the world that is accessible to everyone.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55
James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994