|Privileged Access, philosophy of mind: what is meant here is the access a human subject has to his own inner states. It is debatable whether there is any privileged access at all. Counter-arguments are put forward by authors who assume that one can only grasp one’s feelings in a public language, that is, with concepts learned in the external world. See also introspection, foreign psychological, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
To each of us belongs a stream of episodes that are not direct experiences themselves and to which we have privileged, but by no means immutable or infallible, access. (> Privileged access/Sellars). They can occur without open language behavior.
The word ideas are not the thinking itself. Nor is the open speech behavior thinking itself. We do not need to have word ideas, we do not need to have an idea at all when we know what we are thinking. It is wrong to construct the privileged access according to the model of perception.
I ~ 95
Privileged access/Sellars: self-ascription due to observation by others. Only after that the speech of privileged access starts.
Private: no "absolute privacy". Open behavior is an indispensable part of the logic of these terms, such as the observable behavior of gases is evidence of molecular processes.
Report: (still) requires privileged access._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977