|Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Predicate/property/realism/Schiffer: realism assumes (erroneously) that predicate and property are in the same relation as name and object. - Vs: there is no entity - "the property to be modest" - solution: the understanding of "Mother Teresa is modest" only requires knowledge of Teresa, not of modesty - properties/Schiffer: do not exist, they are not to find among the things which exist - but: in a loose sense ("there is", substitutional quantification) there are properties. - Nominalism: logical form of "Teresa is modest": Fa instead of Fab - Schiffer: nominalism should nevertheless accept: E.g. "there is something that Teresa has, namely modesty" - but not: E.g. what Al and Betty have in common. - Solution/Schiffer: substitutional quantification: a substitution instance of "Teresa has X" is true.
There are/exist/substitutional quantification/sQ/Lycan: (1979): Allowes for example: "there are many things that do not exist". E.g. the monster of Loch Ness, etc ..._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987