Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Predicates - Dictionary of Arguments
I 174f Predication: is a combination of a general term with a singular term. General term: also verb, adjective, (also attributive), noun. Singular term before "is" - then general term ("is" = prefix). I 311 Singular term: can always be traced back to the form "=a" (except if variable) - i.e. it is actually a general term. (predicate)! Example "=Mama","=Socrates","=Pegasus". >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. I 323 Elimination of singular terms: is the fusion of "=" with a piece of text but "=" remains together with variables in a predicative position. "=" is a predicative general term. II 61 ff Naming: Name or singular term - Designate: predicate - both are reference, not meaning. >Reference/Quine. II 158/159 Predicate/Object/Quine: in our world, moment to moment identification is governed by the principle of individuation of predicates. They are neutral to the actual quantification of physical objects, because quantification respects all moment to moment groups, no matter how randomly they are composed. For the predicates, however, they are of importance: since all propositions contain predicates, the identification at the corresponding place is a decisive thing for the truth value. >Truth Value/Quine. Likewise one needs a cross-world identification, which is relative to the predicates used in each case. Also here it will be mostly such for bodies. However, our identification for bodies was based on space displacement, shape change, and chemical change. II 199 Predicate: is a sentence with a gap - general term: is a special type predicate with a gap at a particular end. II 205 Predicate/Tradition: is not always a separated, it is continuous character string (unlike a general term) - the predicate letter F always had to remain connected with an argument. New: term abstracts allow predicates to be combined to general terms. This is the logical operation of predication. >Predication/Quine. VII (f) 115 Predicate/Quine: has no names of classes - classes are their extensions: the things from which the predicate is true. Theory of validity appeals to classes, but not to individual sentences. X 7ff Predicate/Quine: by this I mean only those barbaric expressions that produce statements when completed with variables or individual terms. No attributes. IX 128 Existence/Subject/Predicate/Quine: if the existence is questionable, it is better to use a predicate - ((s) E.g. pedantically is applicable, even if the figure of Beckmesser does not exist.) - Quine: instead of class term sequence for transfinite sequences, being able to have the NO (class of ordinal numbers) as an argument, better predicate Term SEQ - ((s)> lambda calculus). X 50 Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties - so you can call them syncategorematic. Other authors: Vs.See also more autors on predicates. X 102 Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties, but of objects. >Object/Quine. XII 68 Universal Predicates/Quine: they do exist. E.g. self-identity - E.g. "Is different from Hans or sings" - universal words/Carnap: quasi-syntactical predicates: are applicable to everything, without empiricism, only because of the meaning - Quine: is no solution to ontological relativity. - ((s) i.e. the question of what we refer to ultimately)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Predicates
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19