|Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
|Completed them with variables or individual terms. No attributes.
Existence/Subject/Predicate/Quine: if the existence is questionable, it is better to use a predicate - ((s) E.g. pedantically is applicable, even if the figure of Beckmesser does not exist.) - Quine: instead of class Term Sequence for transfinite sequences, being able to have the NO (class of ordinal numbers) as an argument, better predicate Term SEQ - ((s)> lambda operator).
Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties - so you can call them syncategorematic. - Other authors: Vs.
Predicate/Quine: are not names of properties, but of objects.
Universal predicates/Quine: they do exist. - E.g. self-identity - E.g. "Is different from Hans or sings" - universal words/Carnap: quasi-syntactical predicates: applicable to everything, without empiricism, only because of the meaning - Quine: is no solution to ontological relativity. - ((s) i.e. the question of what we refer to ultimately)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003