# Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 174f
Predication: is a combination of a general term with a singular term. General term: also verb, adjective, (also attributive), noun. Singular term before "is" - then general term ("is" = prefix).
I 311
Singular term: can always be traced back to the form "=a" (except if variable) - i.e. it is actually a general term. (predicate)! Example "=Mama","=Socrates","=Pegasus".
>General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine.
I 323
Elimination of singular terms: is the fusion of "=" with a piece of text but "=" remains together with variables in a predicative position. "=" is a predicative general term.
II 61 ff
Naming: Name or singular term - Designate: predicate - both are reference, not meaning.
>Reference/Quine.
II 158/159
Predicate/Object/Quine: in our world, moment to moment identification is governed by the principle of individuation of predicates. They are neutral to the actual quantification of physical objects, because quantification respects all moment to moment groups, no matter how randomly they are composed.
For the predicates, however, they are of importance: since all propositions contain predicates, the identification at the corresponding place is a decisive thing for the truth value.
>Truth Value/Quine.
Likewise one needs a cross-world identification, which is relative to the predicates used in each case. Also here it will be mostly such for bodies. However, our identification for bodies was based on space displacement, shape change, and chemical change.
II 199
Predicate: is a sentence with a gap - general term: is a special type predicate with a gap at a particular end.
II 205
Predicate/Tradition: is not always a separated, it is continuous character string (unlike a general term) - the predicate letter F always had to remain connected with an argument. New: term abstracts allow predicates to be combined to general terms. This is the logical operation of predication.
>Predication/Quine.
VII (f) 115
Predicate/Quine: has no names of classes - classes are their extensions: the things from which the predicate is true. Theory of validity appeals to classes, but not to individual sentences.
X 7ff
Predicate/Quine: by this I mean only those barbaric expressions that produce statements when completed with variables or individual terms. No attributes.
IX 128
Existence/Subject/Predicate/Quine: if the existence is questionable, it is better to use a predicate - ((s) E.g. pedantically is applicable, even if the figure of Beckmesser does not exist.) - Quine: instead of class term sequence for transfinite sequences, being able to have the NO (class of ordinal numbers) as an argument, better predicate Term SEQ - ((s)> lambda calculus).
X 50
Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties - so you can call them syncategorematic. Other authors: Vs.See also more autors on predicates.
X 102
Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties, but of objects.
>Object/Quine.
XII 68
Universal Predicates/Quine: they do exist. E.g. self-identity - E.g. "Is different from Hans or sings" - universal words/Carnap: quasi-syntactical predicates: are applicable to everything, without empiricism, only because of the meaning - Quine: is no solution to ontological relativity. - ((s) i.e. the question of what we refer to ultimately).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

> Counter arguments against Quine

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-28