|Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
Books on Amazon
Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular,
Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.)
II I preface (Putnam)
Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable.
II IV Preface
No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive. VsCarnap
Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative.
This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary.
More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict:
E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable.
Grue/Goodman: If we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t.
Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations.
A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates.
When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demanded too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same classes.
Continuation/predicates: statement: "Time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t - variant: Real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects.
One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous".
Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself.
The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and are usually further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction.
"Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989