|Predicates, philosophy, logic: predicates are symbols that can stand in logical formulas for properties. In fact, not every predicate stands for a property, since it has contradictory predicates, but no contradictory properties. For example, one can think of a predicate "squaround" for "square and round", that is, two properties that exclude each other. One can then truthfully say "Nothing is squaround". There are therefore more predicates than properties. See also round square, scheme characters, quantification, 2nd level logic, predication, attributes, adjectives.|
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Frege: E.g. A sentence that speaks of a unicorn is a sentence without truth value; predicates cannot be assigned or denied. (>Nonexistence - thought: is the same whether the expression has a reference ("meaning") or not.
Berka I 87
Predicate/Frege: you could make do with a single one, "is a fact" - then there is no question of subject/Predicate.
Brandom I 943
Frege: (great discovery): There must be complex predicates in this sense: so that the inferential role of sentences E.g. "Anyone who admires someone who admires themselves" can be recognized. (x)(y)[Rxy > Rxx]. (Can also occur in a language without quantification) - Strawson: this is the second distinguishing feature of singular terms and predicates: terms can be quantified.
EMD II 226ff
Predicate/Frege: Function: takes objects as arguments and provides truth values as a value.
Frege II 71
Predicate/Frege: E.g. "falling under the concept of human" - which means the same as "a human" - ((s) later authors: "is a human being" - "is" belongs to the predicate.
Tugendhat I 192
Predicate/Frege/Tugendhat: also in Frege the predicate stands for something, but something non-objective: the concept. - (VsObject Theory) - ("stand for").
Tugendhat I 193
Predicate/Frege: has no reference - not because it were contradictory, but because of indeterminacy.
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992