Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Pierre example: (from Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds. “Propositions and Attitudes” (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 124.) Pierre has learned that Londres is a beautiful city. He also believes at the same time that London is ugly. The problem is a special one here, as it is not about "capital of ...", but names, which are supposed to not change their referents. See also reference, propositional attitudes, de re, de dicto, thought objects, intensional objects, opacity.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 144
Kripke/Dummett: (Pierre-Example, Londres-Example) translation is not a hypothesis, but a constitutive principle (public language instead idiolect) - (> VsQuine: idiolect has no priority).

((s) Explanation/(s): Piere believes that Londres is beautiful but he heard that London is ugly.)

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-28