Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Pierre example: (from Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds. “Propositions and Attitudes” (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 124.) Pierre has learned that Londres is a beautiful city. He also believes at the same time that London is ugly. The problem is a special one here, as it is not about "capital of ...", but names, which are supposed to not change their referents. See also reference, propositional attitudes, de re, de dicto, thought objects, intensional objects, opacity.
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II 151
Pierre-Example/Londres/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if interpreted de re, the belief is about London. - description theory / Cresswell: for this example there is no problem at all - ((s) Londres and London are dirrerent for Pierre because of different descriptions differ.) - Causal Theory / (s): problem: the must assume meaning of the name of the carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed to the same carrier .

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23