|Pierre example: (from Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds. “Propositions and Attitudes” (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 124.) Pierre has learned that Londres is a beautiful city. He also believes at the same time that London is ugly. The problem is a special one here, as it is not about "capital of ...", but names, which are supposed to not change their referents. See also reference, propositional attitudes, de re, de dicto, thought objects, intensional objects, opacity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Pierre-Example/Londres/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if interpreted de re, the belief is about London.
Description theory/Cresswell: for this example there is no problem at all - ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions.)
Causal Theory/(s): problem: the causal theory must assume the meaning of the name of the bearer and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed to the same bearer.
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Explanation/(s): Pierre has heard that London is ugly and he believes it - at the same time he believes "Londres est jolie". _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984