|Pierre example: (from Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds. “Propositions and Attitudes” (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 124.) Pierre has learned that Londres is a beautiful city. He also believes at the same time that London is ugly. The problem is a special one here, as it is not about "capital of ...", but names, which are supposed to not change their referents. See also reference, propositional attitudes, de re, de dicto, thought objects, intensional objects, opacity.|
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Name / Londres-Example/Pierre / Kripke / Chisholm: Solution: self-ascription of each true proposition, not a contradiction: Pierre attributes the property to himself, that the thing for which he normally uses "Londres" is pretty.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004