Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Physicalism: within the philosophy of the mind, physicalism represents the thesis that mental processes are to be traced back to physical processes. See also materialism, identity theory, naturalism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 138
SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary.
I 142f
Definition ontological physicalism/O.P./Schiffer: thesis: has no irreducible psychological entities. - Definition Sententialist physicalism/S.Ph.: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong) - if there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. - Definition Sententialist Dualism/S.D.: there are true psychological sentences. - Belief properties (b.p.) if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/O.D./SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable - Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism: because both are true, there are no belief propositions - NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-25
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