Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Physicalism: within the philosophy of the mind, physicalism represents the thesis that mental processes are to be traced back to physical processes. See also materialism, identity theory, naturalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen Schiffer on Physicalism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 138 SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary. >Beliefs/Schiffer. I 142f Def Ontological physicalism/Schiffer: thesis: ontological physicalism has no irreducible psychological entities. Def Sententialist physicalism: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong). If there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. Def Sententialist Dualism: there are true psychological sentences. Belief properties: if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable. Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism/Schiffer: because both are true, there are no belief propositions. NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs. >Dualism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Physicalism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19