Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Phenomenology: is the philosophical direction, which goes back to E. Husserl and which assumes that the phenomena of the objects are what is given to us immediately. According to this assumption, these phenomena are the only evident things to us. See also representation, phenomena, perception, certainty, evidence.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Hintikka I 108
HusserlVsMach/PhenomenologyVsPhenomenalism/Mach: only measured things exists.
I 156 ff
Phenomenology/atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: many authors: because of the required independence of the sentences, the Tractatus cannot be interpreted phenomenologically. - Problem: if "this is red" and "this is green" exclude each other, they are no longer independent - therefore phenomenological predicates cannot be Tractatus-objects.
I 199ff
Phenomenology/color/color terms/color words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the Tractatus-idea to conceive the color-incompatibility as matter of logic, has a clear resemblance to what one might call a phenomenology of colors - the logic that we take from the experience, has nothing to do with facts, but only with meanings.
WittgensteinVsMach: pro "grammatical" phenomenology.
Objects/Tractatus: nothing but the meanings of the names.
I 201
Phenomenology: here it is all about possibility, that is, about the sense, not the truth.
I 202
The goal to understand the phenomena remains after changing the base language - but there can be no phenomenology as science anymore.
I 204
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsHusserl: no intermediate thing between logic and science - the temptation to it comes from E.g.: "If I add white, the colorfulness reduces" - that cannot be a physical sentence and also not a logic one.
I 215
Phenomenology/WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: E.g. the description of a complex form as pieces of a circle is much easier. - ((s) idealization, instead of attempting to fulfill the phenomena.)
I 222
WittgensteinVsPhenomenology/Hintikka: Phenomenological objects do not seem to be able to act as values of quantifiers - they do not behave logically like real objects.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-25