|Phenomenalism: is the notion that it is the manner of experience of the objects, and not the objects in themselves to which we can refer. In this case, the existence of the corresponding objects is not assumed in principle for all sensory impressions. See also empiricism, perception, sensory perception, sensory impressions.|
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Phenomenalism/Mill/Putnam: we only talk about our feelings- modern form: connects to the instrumentalism: thesis: all the facts are ultimately instrumental - Bohr: science cannot find out how nature is, but what we can say about the nature. - Ethics/phenomenalism: Thesis: statements about values are emotive, not cognitive. (Non-cognitivism). CarnapVsphenomenalism/CarnapVsHusserl: translations of statements about objects in statements about feelings are actually wrong, a wrong kind of reductionism. - Feelings are private, objects are public, reading of measurements is not an experience.
Phenomenalism/Putnam: Motivation: will clear out the apparent conflict between instrumental science and direct interest in nature.
Carnap/Putnam: (The Logical Structure of the World) Final Chapter: Sketch of the ratio of "thing-language" ("thing language" physical language) to feeling-language which is not a translation. - PutnamVsPhenomenalism: that is the old assertion that we could choose the simplest theory.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990