Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Perspective: is the arrangement of objects as it arises with respect to the perception from a geometrical localization of the perceiver within an object space. In a broader sense, taking a foreign perspective also means taking the position of another person or group in the context of a discussion. See also bat example, foreign psychological.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Frank I 142ff
Perspective/Nagel: is not something that is only accessible to a single individual - it is rather a type. - ((s) if we were unable to take the perspective of someone else, we would not know what the concept means - If perspective belonged only to us, the concept would exist just as little as Wittgenstein’s Beetle) - Nagel: it is the concepts which are bound to perspective, not the physical structure - hence the different structure of the bat is not an argument against understanding - we can give up our perspective in favor of another and yet mean same things. Frank I 145


Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450

- - -
I Nagel 52
Perspective/subjectivity/Nagel: there is no place where the perspectivist could settle.
Peacocke I 167
I/Nagel: I am not truer from one point of of view than from another - the world contains no points of view - no facts of the first person.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-10-16
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