|Perspective: is the arrangement of objects as it arises with respect to the perception from a geometrical localization of the perceiver within an object space. In a broader sense, taking a foreign perspective also means taking the position of another person or group in the context of a discussion. See also bat example, foreign psychological._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 142ff
Perspective/Nagel: is not something that is only accessible to a single individual - it is rather a type. - ((s) if we were unable to take the perspective of someone else, we would not know what the concept means - If perspective belonged only to us, the concept would exist just as little as Wittgenstein’s Beetle) - Nagel: it is the concepts which are bound to perspective, not the physical structure - hence the different structure of the bat is not an argument against understanding - we can give up our perspective in favor of another and yet mean same things. Frank I 145
Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450
- - -
I Nagel 52
Perspective/subjectivity/Nagel: there is no place where the perspectivist could settle.
Peacocke I 167
I/Nagel: I am not truer from one point of of view than from another - the world contains no points of view - no facts of the first person._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976