|Pegasus example: are cases that refer to non-existent objects in everyday language. The problem here is the predicate logical analysis of the corresponding statements. Here the form (Ex) (Fx) (There is an object described by property F) would be needed. However, existence and non-existence would be simultaneously attributed to the object in question. "There is an object that does not exist" is contradictory. On the other hand, the statement "There is a flying horse" is simply wrong. See also existence, existence predicate, non-existence, there is, unicorn example._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Pegasus Example/Non-Existence/Quine: (Ex) (x = Pegasus) wrong with Pegasus as a singular term - right: with Pegasus as a general term = Pegasus - but: (Ex) (x is Pegasus) is wrong (for non-existence).
Pegasus/existence/Quine: if one denies its existence, one does not negate the idea - not the mental entity - solution: Russell: descriptions: the unanalyzed part Author of Waverley has not, as Wyman ((s) = Meinong) assumed, an objective reference - a whole sentence, containing a description can still be true or false (but only as a complete sentence).
Pegasized/socratized/Quine/Lauener: it should not be possible to eliminate in Russell’s way, a name by paraphrasing it by a description. - ((s) But this goes very well with Pegasus.) - One can assume an unanalysed, irreducible attribute of the "being-Pegasus", and rexpress this with the verb ’is-Pegasus" or "pegasized" - so that we can use singular terms without having to assume that there are things they designate - ((s) "There is nothing that pegasizes".) "~(Ex) Fx".
Stalnaker I 55
Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: could exist - the round square could not.
Wyman: These: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003