Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Paratactic analysis, philosophy: the attempt to analyze a compound sentence by juxtaposing the complete sentences derived from it. E.g. the earth rotates. Galileo said that. With this, problems with the attribution of propositional attitudes or indirect speech should be avoided. See also propositions, propositional attitudes, quotation, opacity, all that he said is true.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 122ff
Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: cannot be extended to doctrines - The relation exists through the meaning of the content sentence "The earth moves." - N.B.: thus also expandable to Italian.
I 127
Paratactic Analysis/belief relation/SchifferVsDavidson: the paratactic analysis is not suitable for believing: it cannot be a relation to actual utterances - then there is also no proper two-digit relation. - Identical content/sameness/content/SchifferVsDavidson: he has no concept of identical content of utterances - this only circularly expressible within the paratactic analysis. - ((S) no problem for Davidson)
I 130
Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/Schiffer. For belief: incorrect solution: utterance type - Problem: you have to say of what sort the kind is. - Incorrect solution: "... of the same content" - that would be an artificial term - we do not know yet what concept of content is intended here. - DavidsonVs: we cannot trivialize the role of "content" here (for a belief theory).
I 133
Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/propositional attitude/Schiffer: Problem: a) Sam's propositional attitude that flounders snore (here one must know the content to determine the claim and the truth value - b) Sam's propositional attitude that flounders snore..: here one knows the expression, without needing to know the content of the propositional attitude. - E.g. Pierre: "La neige est blanche" Donald: Tarski said that - according to Davidson, you can know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres utterance. (Without knowing the content). - Solution: one knows that any utterance of Tarski has the same content as ... - only assertion is the fact that Sam said something. (Or has a propositional attitude). - SchifferVsDavidson: if his theory were correct, Sam would (ii) believe something that is true iff flounders snore . - Does not believe of (i) Sam that includes flounders snore - test solution: "utterance type, that has the same content like this" again says nothing about the content - incorrect solution: a feature F (content determining proposition for propositional attitude) this should be known by all people - (these are all objections VsExtensional theory).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-29
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