|Paradoxes: are contradictions within formally correct statements or sets of statements that lead to an existence assumption, which initially seemed plausible, to be withdrawn. Paradoxes are not errors, but challenges that may lead to a re-formulation of the prerequisites and assumptions, or to a change in the language, the subject domain, and the logical system. See also Russellian paradox, contradictions, range, consistency._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Horwich I 114
Liar/Paradox/Tarski: arises when we assume that the language contains the names of the expressions, and semantic terms such as "true" - then the language is Def "semantically closed".
Horwich I 115
Such languages can be eliminated even in the sciences, in which semantic terms are essential.(1)
1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994