Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Paradoxes: are contradictions within formally correct statements or sets of statements that lead to an existence assumption, which initially seemed plausible, to be withdrawn. Paradoxes are not errors, but challenges that may lead to a re-formulation of the prerequisites and assumptions, or to a change in the language, the subject domain, and the logical system. See also Russellian paradox, contradictions, range, consistency._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Nozick on Paradoxes - Dictionary of Arguments
II 276f Achilles/turtle/Carroll/Nozick: logical form: (1) If p then q (2) p. Problem: q is not yet accepted, but it is required that the following will also be accepted explicitly: (3) If (if p then q) and p, then q Regress: the additional assumption (3) (s) in addition to the modus ponens) therefore is: if (1) and (2), q. This then in turn needs an additional premise. >Regress, >Premises. II 277 Solution/tradition: Problem: confusion of premises with inference principles. Then the regress not even begins. >Inference, >Consequence. Solution / Nozick: we need to introduce a premise that has the same shape and all inferences supplies as the other assumptions that are apparently still needed - WittgensteinVs: problems of rule-following, etc. >Zeno, >About Zeno, >Rule following._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19