|Opacity, philosophy: also opacity of the reference. A problem with propositions (meanings of uttered sentences related to a speaker) is that one cannot be certain that one knows what an utterance refers to. E.g. in an empty room is a blackboard with the inscription "I am hungry". See also intensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, reference, inscrutability, quotation.|
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|EMD II 334
Transparency/Opacity/Substitutional quantification/Kripke: Irrelevant here because the point of the traditional view of substitutional quantification is that one can quantify with substitutional quantification into opaque contexts.
EMD II 353
Opacity/Denotation/Kripke: e.g. autonymous interpretation: every term denotes itself, so opacity is excluded since no two terms are codesignative.
EMD II 372
Substitutional quantification/Quine/Kripke: Even allows quantification into opaque contexts - single ontology: one of expressions ((s) not of objects).
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989