|Ontological Commitment: A theory is bound to the acceptance of objects if it were wrong without the existence of these objects. It may be, however, that parts of the theory do not have to contain the object, then the ontological commitment for the whole theory is omitted. (See H. Lauener Quine, 1982, p. 130)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Horwich I 463
DavidsonVsOntological Commitment / DavidsonVsMetaphysics / DavidsonVsQuine / DavidsonVsFacts: the "ontological commitment" is like Dummett’s "facts": relics of metaphysics - they belong to the dualism of scheme / content._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994