|Ontological relativity: One cannot be certain that others structure the world ontologically (divide into objects) as we do, since this cannot be determined empirically. (See H. Lauener Quine, 1982, p. 153). According to Quine, however, the problem is only interesting for infinite domains, since one could specify the objects in the form of lists for finite domains. (See W.V.O. Quine, “Ontologische Relativität”, 2003, p. 78).|
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Ostension/Ontological Relativity/Inscrutability/Quine: we cannot point to an absolute location or speed - as little as to a rabbit or a part ((s)> Gavagai).
Ontological Relativity/Quine: the real problem is not a regress in ever wider framework theories, but the circularity of predicates e.g. "an F is a G" then this requires another predicate for the explanation of "G".
Frame theory: it is useless to question its terms - for that we need more terms.
Ontological Relation: double: 1st depending on the context - 2nd on translation.
Ontological Relativity/Quine: is trivial in a finite area, because the quantification can be replaced by conjunction or disjunction - i.e. the variables are eliminated - then no question of the objects - the same goes for endless theories as long as each object has a name.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003