|Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Ontology/reality/existence/understanding/realism/McGinn: e.g. steam engines are not inconceivable, if the possible world in which they exist, happens to contain no living beings with the intellectual ability to understand their function.
Neither the transformation from a secret to a problem involves a sudden attack of ontological purity.
The term "home" does not appear in the relevant physical theories, but it does not follow that there are no homes.
Ontology/explanation/McGinn: There is no ontological dependence without ontological explanation because results have a certain relationship to what produces these results._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001