|Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Logic/Ontology/Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptually necessary" - from a conceptual explanation. - If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx - FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God - Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...".
Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of the mind/Field: in the philosophy of the mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology.
Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it).
I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. (s). That is, the assumption that the nonobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980