|Necessity de re: is a controversial form of necessity which assumes that it can be stated about objects whether or not they necessarily have certain properties. The counter position is that necessity can only be assumed de dicto, i.e. as a property of the linguistic forms with which can be spoken about objects. See also de dicto, de re, planet example.|
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|EMD II 309f
Necessity de re/Wiggins: Problem: E.g. certainly Caesar can be essentially a person, without being in that way so that each sequence with Caesar satisfies in second place: (Human (x2)) - reason: it could be that "human" did not mean human.
General problem: asymmetry, de re - E.g. Kripke: Elizabeth II is necessarily (de re), the daughter of George VI - But George VI does not necessarily have to have a daughter - E.g. Chisholm: if a table T has a leg L, then T must have L de re as a part - E.g. Chisholm: But, to say of the table, that it necessarily consists of substructure and board, is not the same as to say of substructure and board that they are necessarily parts of the table - and also not that the board is necessarily connected to the substructure.
Wiggins: nevertheless, if anything is certain, it is this: [(lx)(ly)[xRy] = [(ly)(lx)[y converse-Rx] - it would be a perverse extreme in the other direction, if one wanted to banish the corresponding biconditional from the truth theory for L - Wiggins: no matter what one thinks of this mereological essentialism, it means that when the legs exist, the rest of the table needs not to exist - solution: more specific description of essential properties, e.g. through points in time: (t) (table exists at t)> (leg is part of table at t)) then Necessary [(ly)(lw)[(t)((y exists at t) > (w is part of y at t)))], [table, leg].
That secures the desired asymmetry - problem: because of the existential generalization it does not work for the need-of-origin doctrine - more general solution: distinction: wrong: [Necessary [(lx)(ly)(x consists of y], [leg, table] - undesirable consequences for existence that would be proven from it - and [Necessary [(lx)(x consists of table], [leg] (also wrong) - and finally: [Necessary (ly)(leg consists of y],[table] - (what is right or wrong, depends on whether Kripke or Chisholm is right).
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989