Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Necessity de re: is a controversial form of necessity which assumes that it can be stated about objects whether or not they necessarily have certain properties. The counter position is that necessity can only be assumed de dicto, i.e. as a property of the linguistic forms with which can be spoken about objects. See also de dicto, de re, planet example.
 
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I 257
Necessity de re/necessary de re/Simons: E.g. Tom cannot exist without head - ((s) if he exists, then not headless) - Definition essential/Simons: E.g. Tom cannot exist otherwise than as a huamn - he is essentially human. - Others Vs: ((s) somewhere: Kripke could have been an aardvark.) - Simons: against: necessity de dicto: is a property of sentences. - (De dicto) - then wrong: the fact that Tom is a human would be necessary. - Must de re/Simons: acribes necessarily an object an attribute. - Range/(s): through distinguishing the range of the N-operator "de re" and "de dicto" must no longer be mentioned - de dicto necessary sentence. - De re: sentence, attributing necessity - must de re: talks about necessary facts - (there are none). - Wiggins: alternatively: "Necessity: modifies predicates (instead of sentence operator.)
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I 269
Necessity/Wiggins: based on l-abstraction (lambda abstraction) is working, instead of using the sentence operator "N". - QuineVsWiggins: misleading: "Nec[(lx)(ly)(x = y)]" " the relation as any r and s have, if they are necessarily identical » correct: "(lx)(ly)(N(x = y)"(p. 293) - SimonsVsWiggins: " Nec  seems to be superfluous and Wiggins indicates it himself.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987


> Counter arguments against Simons



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23