Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Necessity de re: is a controversial form of necessity which assumes that it can be stated about objects whether or not they necessarily have certain properties. The counter position is that necessity can only be assumed de dicto, i.e. as a property of the linguistic forms with which can be spoken about objects. See also de dicto, de re, planet example.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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EMD II 375
Necessary de re (Quine: = "essentialism") is incomprehensible - other authors: de re must be reduced to de dicto (also belief de re).

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


> Counter arguments against Kripke



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30