|Necessity de re: is a controversial form of necessity which assumes that it can be stated about objects whether or not they necessarily have certain properties. The counter position is that necessity can only be assumed de dicto, i.e. as a property of the linguistic forms with which can be spoken about objects. See also de dicto, de re, planet example._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
de re/Necessity de re/de dicto/Kripke: some philosophers thought that the neccessity de re is incomprehensible as long as it is not reduced to necessity de dicto (or belief de re to belief de dicto) (their "de dicto counterparts").
Or at least that the entailment relationship between de dicto and a corresponding de re statement (about necessity or belief) is clarified.
Quine: neccessity de re (="essentialism") is even incomprehensible if the alleged de dicto counterpart is understandable.
Substitutional quantification/Kripke: but for substitutional quantification these problems do not occur at all. Then it can even be quantified into modal (opaque, intentional) contexts! Prerequisite: that the modality is understandable when applied to closed sentences.
Reason: the conditions (4) (6) and the truth conditions for closed sentences are always reduced to the truth conditions for other closed sentences.
Substitutional Quantification/Quine: he has even shown that in opaque contexts like quotes (there is nothing more opaque) where nobody assumes that fulfillment of referential variables makes sense, substitutional quantification is understandable. (We have shown this in section 5).
But this is only possible with de dicto instead of de re._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984