Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on Necessity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine. II 292 Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention. Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). >Operators, >Rigidity. II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16