Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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EMD II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/VsEssentialism: not independent of our specification of the objects.
II 292
Wiggins: Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde - also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary...").
II 301
Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human" - Wiggins pro second method -> Definition fulfillment for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization.
II 303
Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human) - de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human).

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24