Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 126
Necessary/Wessel: often: "~ p > p" interpreted as necessary - Problem: no way to differentiate between "p" and "p is necessary" - "logically impossible": "p> ~ p": then "~ p" and "p is impossible" equivalent.
I 344
Necessity/Wessel: when I designate a sentence as needed, I give a hint about my judgment reasons - possibility: Speaker abstains from judgment.
I 350
Logical/physically necessary/Wessel: 1. what is logically necessary is also factually necessary - 2. What is factually possible is also logically possible - 3. What is factually not necessary, is also not logically necessary - 4. what is logically impossible , is also factually impossible - logical modality sets limits on the factual modality - because logical modality alone from linguistic requirements, not ontologically - logical truth is equivalent to logical demonstrability and logical necessity - logical falsifiability is equivalent to logical falsehood and logical impossibility.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Wessel

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-22