Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re.
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I 18
Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from optional descriptive semantics that happen to ​​characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references - StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics - they are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all.
I 53
Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds - in order to know that it is true - i.e., that the real world is within this set - for that you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. - Necessary truth is not made true by the facts.
I 64
Metaphysical necessity/Metaph. possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify about it - the modal operators are then just the quantifiers. - Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be.
I 189
Necessary a posteriori/Contingent a priori/Stalnaker: Assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent - both contingent: because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. - Necessary: ​​because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains.
I 201
Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual - Quine: one must ever be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. - Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori - thereby separatation epistemic/metaphysical.
I 202
Def Nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x) means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x - ((s) relative to ppossible world x) - Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN//Staln: Thesis: Laws of Nature are contingent - they do not apply possible worlds - Some authors: LoN are metaphysically necessary. - Logic/Stalnaker/(s): Cannot show what is metaphysically possible.
I 204
Necessity/Conceptual/Metaphys/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. - Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. - Possibilities: would be the same, even if we had never thought of them - conceptually possible: are simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine.
I 205
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25