|Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Kripke I 141
Necessity/needed/Putnam: "cats are animals" is less necessary than "bachelors are unmarried".
Putnam V 72
Metaphysically necessary/Kripke: Putnam: it is "metaphysically necessary" that water is H20, but that is explained by earthly chemistry and earthly facts about speaker intentions regarding reference. - When describing a hypothetical liquid which is not H20 and merely resembles water, one does not describe any possible worlds, in which H2O is not water.
Metaphysically necessary/heat/Kripke/Putnam: Possible Worlds, where heat does not corresponds with molecular motion, are possible. - Language: but then we say that there is a different mechanism that triggers heat sensation.
Identity/Heat/Molecular motion/Kripke: the identity is necessary, but not a priori - the statement is empirical, but necessary.
Molecular motion is an essential property of the temperature - KripkeVsMoore: then equating goodness with utility maximization cannot only be contingently wrong.
KripkeVsNon-Cognitivism: from the fact that the words are not synonymous, one cannot conclude that the characteristics are not identical.
Pro Moore: He was right that our concepts of natural science are more neutral as opposed to ethical ones. - VsMoore: but that does not mean that the good did not exist._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984