Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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S.A. Kripke on Necessity - Dictionary of Arguments
I 116 Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: it will turn out with necessity. >Goldbach's conjecture, >necessary a posteriori. I would suggest, however, that it is not a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum of the properties which are usually attributed to him. Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not have been otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat = molecular motion - but this has no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory, >Pain/Kripke. I 116 Def necessity/Kripke: identity assertions in which both expressions designate rigidly constitute necessity. E.g. »Water is H20". Water could not have been something else. It is essential for water that it is this material with this atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water. >Rigidity/Kripke. - - - Frank I 121f Necessary/Kripke: compounds formed with two or more rigid designation expressions are necessary, e.g. that pain simply feels like pain. Contingent/Kripke: e.g. the fact that there are living beings on this planet (namely us) who feel heat a certain way. E.g. that heat feels to us as it feels. Tradition: a brain condition could also occur without pain. I 122 Necessary/essential properties/KripkeVsTradition: the type of picking out pain (by experience) and the brain state (configuration of molecules) in both cases is essential and not accidental. The brain state could be singled out through contingent facts, but not the pain. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. Kripke I 144 Necessary properties do not have to belong to the meaning. (The periodic table was discovered later). Scientific discoveries do not change the meaning. Meaning does not arise from properties. >Meaning/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke. --- Stalnaker I 188 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: typical cases: statements that contain names e.g. Hesperus = Phosphorus (see below: they were determined by different causal chains). Statements about natural kinds: e.g. "the atomic weight of gold is 79". >Morning star/evening star, >Natural kinds/Kripke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19