Dictionary of Arguments

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Nominalism: nominalism is the view that universals (for example, triangles, blackness) are merely artificial constructions from individual cases. The linguistic expressions are merely names for these constructs. See also universalism, conceptualism, general terms, categories, generalization, generality.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II (b) 34
Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals) - Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) all exactly similar properties - Representatives of universals (Armstrong): many individuals with the same property - universals realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class.
- - -
II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals.
II (c) 97
Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical"
II (c) 97
Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-19
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