|Non-existence, philosophy: non-existence is not simply expressible for the classical predicate logic which attributes properties through quantification in the form of (Ex)(Fx) "There is at least one x, with the property F" (in short "There is at least one F"), since existence is not a property. The form "There is at least one x that does not exist" is contradictory. See also existence predicate, "There is", existence, unicorn example, pegasus example, round square, proof of God's existence.|
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|Stalnaker I 55f
Non-existence/empty name/Meinong/QuineVsWyman/Quine/Stalnaker: (fictional Wyman)/Quine: a distinction between "there is" and "exists" (reserved for actuality). - QuineVs: existence is no predicate that introduces a distinctive property. - Wyman creates the illusion of a match between Meinongians and their critics. - Stalnaker: pro Quine: Existence: applies to everything, what can be quantified.
Stalnaker I 55
Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: Pegasus could have existed - the round square does not.
Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003