|Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Crispin Wright on Negation - Dictionary of Arguments
Negation/logic/truth/correctness/correct: if both truth and correctness are playing a role, there is a distinction (see above > Neg) between the
a) proper, strict negation: turns any true or correct sentence in a false or incorrect - another negation form:
b) negation: acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly then when his argument does not reach truth.
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal does indeed assume that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
A perfectly reasonable counterproposal is, however, that A should be rather complementary to the strict notion of the former negation.
Then, for the case that A is only correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative.
WrightVsVs: but the (DB) carpet now throws elsewhere wrinkles
Negation: Definition negation operator "Neg": "Neg A" is true if A is false and false in all other cases (e.g. with a lack of assertibility or Super-assertibility) - incorrect solution: then with low validity of A <> B: negation equivalence "Neg (P) is true" <> Neg ("P" is true)? - WrightVs: that will not work, even with "assertible" instead of "true"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008