Dictionary of Arguments

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Laws of Nature, philosophy: laws of nature (physical laws) are descriptions of dependencies of physical quantities among each other. From the fact that these are descriptions, it follows that these are no regulations in the sense of e.g. legal regulations. N. Goodman suggests in “Fact, Fiction and Forecast” (1954) that natural laws should be formulated in the form of irreal conditional sentences (also known as counterfactual conditionals); If A were the case, B would have been the case. See also counterfactual conditionals, irreal conditionals, laws, lawlikeness, law statements.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 137
Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Law/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O not a law of nature - two all-quantifications on molecules and water - each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion - Ontology: what entities exist is inextricably linked with law of nature - but also distinguishable from it.
III 158
Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one.
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II (a) 17
Laws of nature/Armstrong: not true statements of law, but truth-makers - VsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - LoN: can be identified with relations between universals (properties) - Camp: realistic view - E.g. possession of a property leads to possession of another property - LoN/Armstrong: contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically.
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Place I 25
Law of nature/Armstrong: Relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVs: smuggles modality in (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal).
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III 44
Laws of nature/Armstrong: no causal factors - exists only when instantiated - logical consequence (that three values ​​of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected) is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-16
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