|Naturalistic fallacy: is described as the error to infer from being to what should be. From the fact that something is the way it is, cannot be concluded that it should be like this. The expression comes from the Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore (1903), but the problem goes much further back and has already been pre-formulated by G. Hume in his “A Treatise of Human Nature” (1738-40). Another name for the problem is the is-ought problem._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Naturalistic fallacy: "Should" cannot follow from "being". Kuhn: This sentence has become a phrase and is no longer implemented everywhere in practice.
Stanley Cavell and others have discovered significant contexts in which the normative and the descriptive are inseparably connected.
My descriptive generalizations speak for the theory because they can also be derived from it, while they develop anomalous behavior in other conceptions of the nature of science.
This argument is circular, but it is not a bad circle. (Hermeneutic circleVsnaturalistic fallacy). (I 219)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973