Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Naturalistic fallacy: is described as the error to infer from being to what should be. From the fact that something is the way it is, cannot be concluded that it should be like this. The expression comes from the Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore (1903), but the problem goes much further back and has already been pre-formulated by G. Hume in his “A Treatise of Human Nature” (1738-40). Another name for the problem is the being-should fallacy.
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Stegmüller IV 186
Being/Should/fallacy/Hume: Thesis: it is impossible to derive a should-sentence solely from is-sentences. - ((s)> Moore: naturalistic fallacy) - Stegmüller: when non-moral use there is no problem because of the hypothetical imperative: E.g. In chess, there is no problem of the transition from "is" to should. Reason: there is no expression of any new relationship! Implicit: what you want, you should.
Solution/SearleVsHume: Attach premises with obligations.
Solution/Searle: institutional fact.
MackieVsSearle: confusion of inside/outside. - We cannot step outside of internalized rules.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

> Counter arguments against Hume
> Counter arguments in relation to Naturalistic Fallacy

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-22