Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Naturalized epistemology: is an expression by W.V. O. Quine (Quine, Willard (2004), "Epistemology Naturalized." In E. Sosa & J. Kim, Epistemology An Anthology, Malden, MA, pp. 292-300). It proposes abandoning traditional epistemology in favor of scientific procedures. The starting point for this consideration is Quine's insight from “Two Dogmas” (Quine, Willard (1994), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism. From a Logical Point of View”, Cambridge, MA pp. 20-46) according to which the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences cannot be traced back to individual present sentences. This is the reason why theories must be considered as a whole. See also analyticity/syntheticity, epistemology.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence - there is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. - brains in a vat - Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world.
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory - solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. - QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge.
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem.
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge.
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? - But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) - Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain - then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another - ((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) - underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things - Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events.
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy at events - StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness - the proof has to be one, too.
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

> Counter arguments against Stroud

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-21