Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 230
Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous, is not a general term but singular term with dissemination. - Ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object).
I 316
Name: general term that applies only to one object - Ryle: x itself is not a property! - Middle Ages: Socrates, human, mortal: on the same level - closes truth value gaps, claims no synonymy.
VII 12 ~
Name/Quine: always eliminated - language does not need.
VII 75 ~
Name/Quine: Frege: must be substitutable - even possible with abstract entities.
VII 167
Proper names/Quine: can be analyzed as descriptions - then we can eliminate all singular terms as far as theory is concerned.
VIII 24 ~
Name/Quine: are constant substitutions of variables.
X 48
Name always refers to only one object - predicate: refers to many - we replace them in the standard grammar by predicates: first: a= instead of a, then predicate A - the sentence Fa then becomes Ex(Ax.Fx).
X 48
Name/Quine: it is not possible to quantify about them, so they are a different category than variables - names can be replaced by variables, but not always vice versa.
X 124
Name/logic/Substitutional quantification/Quine: problem: never enough names for all objects of the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by any open sentence, it has no name either - otherwise E.g. Name a determination: x e a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be traced back to integers. ((s)>substitution class).
Lauener XI 39
Name/General term/Quine/Lauener: names are eliminated by being reconstructed as a general term. As = a - then: Pegasus/truth value: then "Pegasus flies". (Ex)(X = c u Fx) is wrong, because Pegasus does not exist. (There is no pegasus, the conjunction is wrong). (>unicorn) - logical status of a proper name does not depend on the type of introduction, but only on the relation to other expressions.
XII 78
Name/Quine: distinguished by the fact that they may be inserted for variables.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-22