Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 230
Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous, it is not a general term but a singular term with dissemination. - Ambiguity action/habit: delivery (action, object).
>Ambiguity/Quine
I 316
Name: is a general term that applies only to one object - Ryle: x itself is not a property! - Middle Ages: Socrates, human, mortal: were on the same level - closes truth value gaps, claims no synonymy.
>General Term/Quine, >Truth Value Gap/Quine
VII (a) 12ff
Name/Quine: is always eliminated - language does not need it.
VII (d) 75ff
Name/Quine: Frege: a name must be substitutable - this is even possible with abstract entities.
VII (i) 167
Proper Names/Quine: can be analyzed as descriptions. Then we can eliminate all singular terms as far as theory is concerned.
>Descriptions/Quine
VIII 24ff
Name/Quine: names are constant substitutions of variables.
X 48
A name always refers to only one object - predicate: refers to many. We replace them in the standard grammar by predicates: first: a= instead of a, then predicate A. - The sentence Fa then becomes Ex(Ax.Fx).
>Predicates/Quine
X 48
Name/Quine: it is not possible to quantify about them, so they are a different category than variables - names can be replaced by variables, but not always vice versa.
X 124
Name/logic/Substitutional Quantification/Quine: problem: there are never enough names for all objects of the world: e.g. if a set is not determined by any open sentence, it has no name either. - Otherwise E.g. Name a determination: x ε a - E.g. irrational numbers cannot be traced back to integers. ((s)>substitution class).
Lauener XI 39
Name/General Term/Quine/Lauener: names are eliminated by being reconstructed as a general term. As = a - then: Pegasus/truth value: then "Pegasus flies". (Ex)(X = c u Fx) is wrong, because Pegasus does not exist. (There is no pegasus, the conjunction is wrong). (>unicorn example). - The logical status of a proper name does not depend on the type of introduction, but only on the relation to other expressions.
XII 78
Name/Quine: is distinguished by the fact that they may be inserted for variables.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-01-23
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