|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.|
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|I 119 ~
Names/Hobbes: are names of our ideas - MillVs: convey to the others, what we think of someone (something), not only about our idea - the idea of fire does not cause the heat, even though I must have terms to think.
I 158 ~
Name/existence/Prior: Vs thesis "Name is all what intends to identify a real object: Problem: indirect speech: E.g. the spokesperson believes Holmes exist, but the listener does not: then the speaker is in a position to identify Holmes the listener is not but then the listener cannot tell what the speaker has said (absurd).
Names/KennyVsRussell: covert markings in "B exists" - PriorVsKenny: when names must name something then no name can be used in indirect speech with a known non-existence.
Theory/PriorVsKenny: cannot set up his own theory. - Kenny Thesis: names must intend reference - then the theorist himself cannot even intend to use the name if he talks in his example sentences of non-existent persons.
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003