|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.|
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Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity - "being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property. (property name)
A propos I 42
Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties - ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!)
Saturated: e.g. names - saturated expressions only name saturated entities - Example unsaturated entity: "the paternal descent relation".
Names: of facts and propositions: that-expressions - name of the universal: means the property - name of the concept: means the concept (cannot be possessed like a property).
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004