|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.|
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|This gives the planet-Example a different hue. If the description has a
Def narrow range: we take them to describe various objects in different worlds.
Def long range: means that they refer to the same object in all the worlds, regardless of how many planets there are in that world.
III 133 f
Real names always have a long range (rigid designators, for all the worlds). -
descriptions: are therefore not always rigid, depending on theory. (Not rigid, just for the actual world).
Names/Mill: no sense, purely denotative (also Kripke: no sense, because non-modal statements can have different truth values) - Frege: names have a sense.
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001