Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
II 217
Meaning/name/Lewis: may be a function of worlds on possible individuals - by generic names: function from worlds on quantities.
IV 216
Pseudo name/Lewis: Category S/(S/N) is introduced in addition to any name in the lexicon. - Makes a sentence of a name and a sentence - the category S/SN can now be renamed in nominal phrase (NP) - names: are then superfluous as subjects, but not as objects. - Then replace name: transitive verbs (S/N)/N are replaced by - pseudotransitive verbs: (S/N/(S/(S/N)).
Schw I 223
Names/description/reference/Kripke/Putnam: there is no generally known description for names and species expression that defines to what the expression refers. Descriptions are irrelevant for reference. - LewisVs magical theory of reference: Reference is not a primitive irreducible relationship - non-semantic information is enough to construct a descriptions of which we know a priori that the name picks it out - (Lewis: pro description theory).
Schw I 224 ~
Names/LewisVsKripke: are no rigid designators - ((s) perhaps one counterpart for each description? - E.g. discoverer of incompleteness theorem, son of mother, etc.).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26