|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.|
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Names have no sense, descriptions have a sense.
Name: different sense, the same meaning. Alexander was teacher and student... - facts are not part of the sense of the name.
Names are rigid designation expressions (descriptions are not).
KripkeVsMill: Ordinary proper names of people are not characters that have no sense.
Otherwise we could not understand any sentence in which Socrates appears if we do not know that Socrates means the individual who is called Socrates.
Description does not abbreviate the name - E.g. Even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel still refers to Goedel.
Russell: logical proper names: this: identity without empirical investigation, therefore logical proper names are the only real names.
Name for natural kinds: Gold: could turn out to be blue, but would still be gold (would retain existence).
Concepts for natural kinds: much more closely related to proper names than unusually assumed.
Kripke general names like "cat" do not express any property.
EMD II 362
Names/designate/KripkeVsWallace: not everything has to have a name - not every term is denoted - (> Frege every sentence is significant: ((s) all records with unicorn are false or without truth value).
Prior I 170
Names/Kripke: structureless - simple sentences are wrong if x does not exist.
Stalnaker I 172f
Names/Kripke: Reference is the designated object directly, without the mediation of sense - Frege/Dummett/Searle: sense is a mediator between the name and the designated object - otherwise signing out would be inexplicable - learning a language cannot be explained.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003