Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Gareth Evans
I 310
Names/Evans: pro distinction: speaker name (Intention/belief) // what the name designates - EvansVsKripke: VsIdiolect ((s) So an individually defined reference.)
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I 310
Names: saying the name is not a designation.
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I 311
Names/KripkeVsSpeaker's Reference.
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I 324
Names/EvansVsKripke: it is not about causal relations between being baptized and present speaker behavior. But this is about the relation between the states of the thing and the information set of the speaker. - "Intended Referent" is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the fact that x is the source of the causal origin of the information set.
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I 329
Definition Name/Evans: (on trial): 1. There must be common knowledge that "NN" is the name of x - 2. It must be intended that the success of the reference is based in each case on the common knowledge that a name was used and not a predicate! - (Naming instead of satifying). - The intentions must become manifest, so that the common knowledge arises.
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I 331
Names/Evans: wrong name: e.g. Bible: "Malachi" was by no means the name of the Prophet, but Malachi means: "my messenger" - ((s) e.g. "Istanbul": actually comes from "estan poli" = "into the city": ("there it goes into the city") - this was then coined as a new name for Constantinople.) For example, a copyist is mistaken for the author, but from the fact that the name did not mean the mathematician follows evidently not that the community meant the writer, or that they had asserted falsehoods about him.
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I 333 ~
Name/Pub-Example/Evans: (somebody hears the name Louis respectfully pronounced) - There is an important gap between: 1. intend to refer to the j and to believe that a = j, and 2. intend to refer to a - these are two reasons to withdraw a sentence: a) the thing does not bear the name NN - b) the thing is not NN! (+) - e.g. of the returnees it was not "turnip" instead "turnip has not returned". - ((s) No predication is withdrawn, but the name.)


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-22